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Abstract. Many lightweight block ciphers apply a very simple key
schedule in which the round keys only differ by addition of a round-
specific constant. Generally, there is not much theory on how to choose
appropriate constants. In fact, several of those schemes were recently bro-
ken using invariant attacks, i.e., invariant subspace or nonlinear invariant
attacks. This work analyzes the resistance of such ciphers against invari-
ant attacks and reveals the precise mathematical properties that render
those attacks applicable. As a first practical consequence, we prove that
some ciphers including Prince, Skinny-64 and Mantis7 are not vulnerable
to invariant attacks. Also, we show that the invariant factors of the linear
layer have a major impact on the resistance against those attacks. Most
notably, if the number of invariant factors of the linear layer is small (e.g.,
if its minimal polynomial has a high degree), we can easily find round
constants which guarantee the resistance to all types of invariant attacks,
independently of the choice of the S-box layer. We also explain how to
construct optimal round constants for a given, but arbitrary, linear layer.
Keywords: Block cipher · Nonlinear invariant · Invariant subspace attack
· Linear layer · Round constants · Mantis · Midori · Prince · Skinny · LED
1 Introduction
One of the main topics in symmetric cryptography in recent years is lightweight
cryptography. Even though it is not really clearly defined what lightweight
cryptography exactly is, the main idea can be embraced as designing cryptographic
primitives that put an extreme focus on performance. This in turn resulted in
many new, especially block cipher, designs which achieve better performance by
essentially removing any operations that are not strictly necessary (or believed
to be necessary) for the security of the scheme. One particular interesting case of
reducing the complexity is the design of the key schedule and the choice of round
constants. Both of these are arguably the parts that we understand least and
only very basic design criteria are available on how to choose a good key schedule
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or how to choose good round constants. Consequently, many of the lightweight
block ciphers remove the key schedule completely. Instead, identical keys are
used in the rounds and (often very simple and sparse) round constants are added
on top (e.g., see LED [12], Skinny [3], Prince [4], Mantis [3], Midori [2], to mention
a few).
However, several of those schemes were recently broken using a structural
attack called invariant subspace attack [16,17], as well as the recently published
generalization called nonlinear invariant attack [21]. Indeed, those attacks have
been successfully applied to quite a number of recent designs including PRINT-
cipher [16], Midori-64 [11,21], iSCREAM [17] and SCREAM [21], NORX v2.0 [6],
Simpira v1 [19] and Haraka v.0 [14]. Both attacks, that we jointly call invariant
attacks in this work, notably exploit the fact that these lightweight primitives
have a very simple key schedule where the same round key (up to the addition of
a round constant) is applied in several rounds.
It is therefore of major importance to determine whether a given primitive
is vulnerable to invariant attacks. More generally, it would be interesting to
exhibit some design criteria for the building blocks in a cipher which guarantee
the resistance against these attacks. As mentioned above, this would shed light
on the fundamental open question on how to select proper round constants.
Our Contribution. In this work, we analyze the resistance of several lightweight
substitution-permutation ciphers against invariant attacks. Our framework both
covers the invariant subspace attack, as well as the recently published nonlinear
invariant attack. By exactly formalizing the requirements of those attacks, we
are able to reveal the precise mathematical properties that render those attacks
applicable. Indeed, as we will detail below, the rational canonical form of the
linear layer will play a major role in our analysis. Our results show that the
linear layer and the round constants have a major impact on the resistance
against invariant attacks, while this type of attacks was previously believed to
be mainly related to the behaviour of the S-box, see e.g., [11]. In particular,
if the number of invariant factors of the linear layer is small (for instance, if
its minimal polynomial has a high degree), we can easily find round constants
which guarantee the resistance to all types of invariant attacks, independently of
the choice of the S-box layer. In order to ease the application of our results in
practice, we implemented all our findings in Sage [20] and added the source code
in Appendix D.
In our framework, the resistance against invariant attacks is defined in the
following sense: For each instantiation of the cipher with a fixed key, there is no
function that is invariant for both the substitution layer and for the linear part of
each round. This implies that any adversary who still wants to apply an invariant
attack necessarily has to search for invariants over the whole round function,
which appears to have a cost exponential in the block size in general. Indeed, all
published invariant attacks we are aware of exploit weaknesses in the underlying
building blocks of the round. Therefore, our notion of resistance guarantees
complete security against the major class of invariant attacks, including all
variants published so far.
This paper is split in two parts, a first part (Section 3) which can be seen as
the attacker’s view on the problem and a second part (Section 4) which reflects
more on the designer’s decision on how to avoid those attacks. More precisely,
the first part of the paper details an algorithmic approach which enables an
adversary to spot a possible weakness with respect to invariant attacks within a
given cipher. For the lightweight block ciphers Skinny-64, Prince and Mantis7, the
7-round version of Mantis, this algorithm is used to prove the resistance against
invariant attacks.
These results come from the following observation, detailed in this first part:
Let L denote the linear layer of the cipher in question and let c1, . . . , ct ∈ Fn2 be
the (XOR) differences between two round constants involved in rounds where the
same round key is applied. Furthermore let WL(c1, . . . , ct) denote the smallest
L-invariant subspace of Fn2 that contains all c1, . . . , ct. Then, one can guarantee
resistance if WL(c1, . . . , ct) covers the whole input space Fn2 . As a direct result, we
will see that in Skinny-64, there are enough differences between round constants
to guarantee the full dimension of the corresponding L-invariant subspace. This
directly implies the resistance of Skinny-64, and this result holds for any reasonable
choice of the S-box layer.1 In contrast, for Prince and Mantis7, there are not enough
suitable ci to generate a subspace WL(c1, . . . , ct) with full dimension. However,
for both primitives, we are able to keep the security argument by also considering
the S-box layer, using the fact that the dimension of WL(c1, . . . , ct) is not too
low in both cases.
In the second part of the paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of the impact
of the round constants and of the linear layer on the resistance against invariant
attacks. The first question we ask is the following:
Given the linear layer L of a cipher, what is the minimum number of round
constants needed to guarantee resistance against the invariant attack, indepen-
dently from the choice of the S-box?
Figure 1 shows the maximal dimension that can be reached by WL(c1, . . . , ct)
when t values of ci are considered. It shows in particular that the whole input
space can be covered with only t = 4 values in the case of Skinny-64, while 8 and
16 values are needed for Prince and Mantis respectively. This explains why, even
though Prince and Mantis apply very dense round constants, the dimension does
not increase rapidly for higher values of t. The observations in Fig. 1 are deduced
from the invariant factors (or the rational canonical form) of the linear layer, as
shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Q1, . . . , Qr be the invariant factors of the linear layer L and
let t ≤ r. Then
max
c1,...,ct∈Fn2
dimWL(c1, . . . , ct) =
t∑
i=1
degQi .
1 We have to provide that the S-box has no component of degree 1. If the S-box has
such a linear component, the cipher could be easily broken using linear cryptanalysis.
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Fig. 1: For Skinny-64, Prince and Man-
tis, this figure shows the highest pos-
sible dimension of WL(c1, . . . , ct) for
t values c1, . . . , ct (see Theorem 1).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
P
r(
d
im
W
L
(c
1
,.
..
,c
t
)
=
6
4
)
LED
Skinny64
Prince
Mantis
Fig. 2: For several lightweight ciphers,
this figure shows the probability that
WL(c1, . . . , ct) = Fn2 for uniformly ran-
dom constants ci (see Theorem 2).
For the special case of a single constant c, the maximal dimension of WL(c)
is equal to the degree of the greatest invariant factor of L, i.e., the minimal
polynomial of L. We will also explain how the particular round constants must
be chosen in order to guarantee the best possible resistance.
As designers often choose random round constants to instantiate the primitive,
we were also interested in the following question:
How many randomly chosen round constants are needed to guarantee the best
possible resistance with a high probability?
We derive an exact formula for the probability that the linear subspace
WL(c1, . . . , ct) has full dimension for t uniformly random constants ci. Fig. 2
gives an overview of this probability for several lightweight designs.
Organization of the Paper. The principle of invariant attacks is first briefly
recalled in Section 2. In Section 3, a new necessary condition is established on
the functions which are both invariant for the S-box layer and for the linear
parts (including the round key addition) of all rounds. This leads to a new
security argument against invariant attacks. An algorithm to check whether the
round constants avoid the existence of such invariants is then presented and
applied to several lightweight ciphers, including Mantis7, Skinny-64 and Prince.
Section 4 analyzes in more detail how the choice of the linear layer and of the
round constants affects the resistance against invariant attacks. Some existing
lightweight designs serve as examples to illustrate the arguments.
2 Preliminaries
By Bn, we denote the set of all Boolean functions of n variables. The constant
functions in Fn2 will be denoted by 0 and 1, respectively. The derivative of f ∈ Bn
in direction α ∈ Fn2 is the Boolean function defined as ∆αf := x 7→ f(x+α)+f(x).
The following terminology will be extensively used in the paper. It refers to the
constant derivatives which play a major role in our work.
Definition 1. [15] An element α ∈ Fn2 is said to be a linear structure of f ∈ Bn
if the corresponding derivative ∆αf is constant. The set of all linear structures
of a function f is a linear subspace of Fn2 and is called the linear space of f :
LS(f) := {α ∈ Fn2 | ∆αf = ε, ε ∈ {0,1}} .
The nonlinear invariant attack was described in [21] as a distinguishing attack
on block ciphers. For a block cipher E operating on an n-bit block,
E : Fn2 × Fκ2 → Fn2 , (x, k) 7→ Ek(x) ,
the idea is to find a subset S ⊂ Fn2 such that the partition of the input set into
S ∪ (Fn2 \ S) is preserved by the cipher for as many keys k as possible, i.e.,
Ek(S) = S or Ek(S) = Fn2 \ S .
The special case when S is a linear space corresponds to the so-called invariant
subspace attacks [16].
An equivalent formulation is obtained by considering the n-variable Boolean
function g defined by g(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ S. Then, finding an invariant
consists in finding a function g ∈ Bn such that g + g ◦ Ek is constant. We call
such a function g an invariant for Ek, and we obviously focus on non-trivial
invariants, i.e., on g 6∈ {0,1}. In the following, for any permutation F : Fn2 → Fn2 ,
we denote the set of all invariants for F by
U(F ) := {g ∈ Bn | g + g ◦ F is constant} .
As observed in [21], this set is a linear subspace of Bn. An important remark,
which will be used later, is that if F has a cycle of odd length, then all g ∈ U(F )
satisfy g + g ◦ F = 0.
3 Proving the Absence of Invariants in Lightweight SPNs
In the whole paper, we concentrate on block ciphers which follow the specific
design of substitution-permutation networks (SPNs) as depicted in Figure 3.
Usually, the technique applied for finding invariants for the cipher consists
in exploiting its iterative structure and in searching for functions which are
invariant for all constituent building blocks. Indeed computing invariants for the
round function is in general infeasible for a proper block size, typically n = 64 or
n = 128. Despite the fact that all published invariant attacks we are aware of
exploit invariants for all the constituent building blocks, the algorithm described
in [17] searches for invariant subspaces over the whole round function. However,
it can only be applied in the special case for finding an invariant subspace, and
S L S L S L. . .
k1 kt−1 kt
Fig. 3: SPN with S-box layer S and linear layer L. After the i-th round, one
adds a round key ki, where (k1, . . . , kt) is the expanded key resulting from the
key schedule.
not for detecting an arbitrary invariant set, and only detects spaces of large
dimension efficiently.
Therefore, we consider in the following only those invariants that are invariant
under both the substitution layer S and the linear parts Addki ◦ L of all rounds.
The linear spaces of these invariants have then a very specific structure as pointed
out in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let g ∈ Bn be an invariant for both Addki ◦ L and Addkj ◦ L
for two round keys ki and kj. Then LS(g) is a linear space invariant under L
which contains (ki + kj).
Proof. By definition of g, there exist εi, εj ∈ F2 such that, for all x ∈ Fn2 ,
g(x) = g(L(x) + ki) + εi and g(x) = g(L(x) + kj) + εj .
This implies that, for all x ∈ Fn2 ,
g(L(x) + ki) + g(L(x) + kj) = εi + εj ,
or equivalently, by replacing (L(x) + kj) by y:
g(y + ki + kj) + g(y) = εi + εj , ∀y ∈ Fn2
and thus (ki+kj) ∈ LS(g). We then have to show that LS(g) is invariant under L.
Let s ∈ LS(g). Then, there exists a constant ε ∈ F2 such that g(x) = g(x+ s) + ε.
Since g is an invariant for Addki ◦ L, we deduce
g(L(x) + ki) + εi = g(x) = g(x+ s) + ε = g(L(x) + L(s) + ki) + (εi + ε) .
Finally, we set y := L(x) + ki and obtain
g(y) = g(y + L(s)) + ε (1)
which completes the proof. ut
Therefore, the attack requires the existence of an invariant for the substitu-
tion layer whose linear space is invariant under L and contains all differences
between the round keys.2 The difference between two round keys, which should
2 Note that a similar observation was already made in [1] in the context of the invariant
subspace attack.
be contained in LS(g), is dependent on the initial key. However, if we consider
only designs where some round keys are equal up to the addition of a round
constant, we obtain that the differences between these round constants must
belong to LS(g). Then, LS(g) is a linear space invariant under L which contains
the differences (RCi + RCj) for any pair (i, j) of rounds such that ki = k + RCi
and kj = k + RCj . The smallest such subspaces are spanned by the cycles of L
as shown by the following lemma. We use the angle bracket notation to denote
the linear span.
Lemma 1. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . For any c ∈ Fn2 , the smallest
L-invariant linear subspace of Fn2 which contains c, denoted by WL(c), is
〈Li(c), i ≥ 0〉 .
Proof. Obviously, 〈Li(c), i ≥ 0〉 is included in WL(c), since WL(c) is a linear
subspace of Fn2 and is invariant under L. Moreover, we observe that 〈Li(c), i ≥ 0〉
is invariant under L. Indeed, for any λ1, λ2 ∈ F2 and any (i, j),
L(λ1L
i(c) + λ2L
j(c)) = λ1L
i+1(c) + λ2L
j+1(c)
and then belongs to 〈Li(c), i ≥ 0〉. Then, this subspace is the smallest linear
subspace of Fn2 invariant under L which contains c. ut
Let now D be a set of known differences between round keys, i.e., a subset of
all ki + kj = (RCi + RCj). We define the subset
WL(D) :=
∑
c∈D
〈Li(c), i ≥ 0〉 =
∑
c∈D
WL(c) .
We then deduce from the previous observations that the invariant attack applies
only if there is a non-trivial invariant g for the S-box layer such that WL(D) ⊆
LS(g). A Sage code that computes the linear space WL(D) for a predefined list
D is given in Appendix D (lines 31-38). It has been used for determining the
dimension of WL(D) corresponding to the round constants in several lightweight
ciphers.
Skinny-64. Considering the untweaked version Skinny-64-64, one observes that
the round keys repeat every 16 rounds. We define
D := {RC1 + RC17,RC2 + RC18,RC3 + RC19,RC4 + RC20,RC5 + RC21}
and obtain dimWL(D) = 64.
Skinny-128. In Skinny-128, The round constants are all of the following form:
c0 0 0 0
c1 0 0 0
c2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

with 8-bit values c0 ∈ {0x00, . . . , 0x0f}, c1 ∈ {0x00, . . . , 0x03} and c2 = 0x02.
Then, as the linear layer is defined by a binary matrix, we can see that the
dimension of WL(D) is at most 64, because none of the four most significant bits
will be activated with any round constant.
Prince. Prince uses ten round keys ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, which are all of the form ki =
k+RCi. The so-called α-reflection property implies that, for any i, ki+k11−i = α
where α is a fixed constant. We can then consider the set of (independent) round
constant differences
D = {α,RC1 + RC2,RC1 + RC3,RC1 + RC4,RC1 + RC5} .
We obtain that dimWL(D) = 56.
Mantis. As Prince, Mantis7 follows the α-reflection construction. We therefore
consider the following set of round constant differences:
D = {α,RC1 + RC2,RC1 + RC3,RC1 + RC4,RC1 + RC5,RC1 + RC6,RC1 + RC7}
We obtain that dimWL(D) = 42.
Midori-64. In Midori-64, the round constants are only added to the least
significant bit of each cell and the linear layer does not provide any mixing within
the cells. Then WL(D) = {0000, 0001}16, and has dimension 16 only.
As the invariant attack applies only if there is a non-trivial invariant g for the
S-box layer such that WL(D) ⊆ LS(g), by intuition, the attack should be harder
as the dimension of WL(D) increases. In the following, we analzye the impact of
the dimension of WL(D) to the applicability of the attack in detail and present
a method to prove the non-existence of invariants based on this dimension.
3.1 The Simple Case
We first consider a simple case, that is when the dimension of WL(D) is at least
n− 1.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the dimension of WL(D) is at least n− 1. Then,
any g ∈ Bn such that WL(D) ⊆ LS(g) is linear or constant. As a consequence,
there is no non-trivial invariant g of the S-box layer such that WL(D) ⊆ LS(g),
unless the S-box layer has a component of degree 1.
Proof. From [5, Prop. 14], it follows that
dim LS(g) ≥ k ⇔ deg(g) ≤
{
n− k if k 6= n
1 if k = n
.
This implies that g must be linear or constant. Linear invariants imply the exis-
tence of a linear approximation with probability 1, or equivalently that the S-box
has a component (i.e., a linear combination of its coordinates) of degree 1. ut
In the rest of the paper, we will implicitly exclude the case when the S-box
has a component of degree 1, as the cipher would be already broken by linear
cryptanalysis.
Skinny-64. As shown before, for the untweaked version Skinny-64-64 one obtains
dimWL(D) = 64. This indicates that the round constants do not allow non-trivial
invariants that are invariant for both the substitution and the linear parts of
Skinny-64, and this result holds for any choice of the S-box layer.
Unfortunately, the dimension of WL(D) is not high enough for the other ci-
phers we considered. For those primitives, we therefore cannot prove the resistance
against invariant attacks based on the linear layer only.
3.2 When the Dimension is Smaller than (n − 1)
Not every cipher applies round constants such that the dimension of WL(D) is
larger than or equal to n− 1. Even for Prince and Mantis, which have very dense
round constants, it is not the case and we cannot directly rely on this argument.
However, if n− dim(WL(D)) is small, we can still prove that the invariant attack
does not apply but only by exploiting some information on the S-box layer. This
can be done by checking whether there exists a non-trivial invariant g for the
S-box layer which admits some given elements as 0-linear structures, in the sense
of the following definition.
Definition 2. A linear structure α of a Boolean function f is called a 0-linear
structure if the corresponding derivative equals the all-zero function. The set
of all 0-linear structures of f is a linear subspace of LS(f) denoted by LS0(f).
Elements β s.t. ∆βg = 1 are called 1-linear structures of f .
Note that 0-linear structures are also called invariant linear structures. It is well-
known that the dimension of LS0(f) drops by at most 1 compared to LS(f) [7].
Checking that all invariants are constant based on 0-linear structures.
In the following, we search for an invariant g for the S-box layer S that is also
invariant for the linear part of each round. Suppose now, in a first step, that we
know a subspace Z of LS(g) which is composed of 0-linear structures only. In
other words, we now search for an invariant g for S such that LS0(g) ⊇ Z for
some fixed Z. If the dimension of this subspace Z is close to n, we can try to
prove that any such invariant is constant based on the following observation.
Proposition 3. Let g be an invariant for an n-bit permutation S such that
LS0(g) ⊇ Z for some given subspace Z ⊂ Fn2 . Then
– g is constant on each coset of Z;
– g is constant on S(Z).
Proof. Since Z ⊆ LS0(g), for any a ∈ Fn2 , we have that g(a + z) = g(a) for all
z ∈ Z, i.e., g is constant on all (a+ Z). Now, we use that g is an invariant for S,
which means that there exists ε ∈ F2 such that g(S(x)) = g(x) + ε. Since g is
constant on Z, we deduce that g is constant on S(Z). ut
To show that g must be trivial, the idea is to evaluate the S-box layer at some
points in Z and deduce that g takes the same value on all corresponding cosets.
The number of distinct cosets of Z equals 2n−dimZ , which is not too large when
dimZ is close to n. Then, we hope that all cosets will be hit when evaluating S
at a few points in Z. In this situation, g must be a constant function. In other
words, we are able to conclude that there do not exist non-trivial invariants for
both the substitution layer and the linear part.
In our experiments, we used the following very simple algorithm. If it termi-
nates, all invariants must be constant. An efficient implementation in Sage of
Algorithm 1 is given in Appendix D.
Algorithm 1 Checking that U(S) ∩ {g ∈ Bn | Z ⊆ LS0(g)} is trivial
1: R = {}
2: repeat
3: z
$← Z
4: Compute S(z)
5: Add to R a representative of the coset defined by S(z)
6: until |R| = 2n−dimZ
Determining a suitable Z from WL(D). Up to now, we assumed the knowl-
edge of a subspace Z of WL(D) for which Z ⊆ LS0(g) for all invariants g we are
considering. But, the fact that some elements are 0-linear structures depends on
the actual invariant g and thus, each of the elements d ∈WL(D) might or might
not be a 0-linear structure. However, some 0-linear structures can be determined
by using one of the two following approaches.
First approach. The first observation comes from (1) in the proof of Prop. 1.
Lemma 2. Let g ∈ Bn be an invariant for Addki ◦ L for some ki and let V be a
subspace of LS(g) which is invariant under L. Then, for any v ∈ V , (v +L(v)) ∈
LS0(g).
Proof. Let v ∈ V . Similar as in the proof of Prop. 1, we use that g is an invariant
for Addki ◦ L and see that there exists an ε ∈ F2 such that, for all x ∈ Fn2 ,
g(x) = g(x+ v) + ε = g(x+ L(v)) + ε .
We finally set y := x+ v and obtain
g(y) = g(y + v + L(v)) ,
implying that v + L(v) is a 0-linear structure for g. ut
Following the previous lemma, one option is to just run Algorithm 1 on
Z = WL(D
′) with D′ = {d + L(d), d ∈ D}. The disadvantage is that the
dimension of Z might be too low and therefore the algorithm might be too
inefficient. In this case, one can also consider a different approach and run
the algorithm several times, by considering all possible choices for the 0-linear
structures among all elements in D. Suppose that, in the initial set of constants
D = {d1, d2, . . . , dm, . . . , dt}, the elements d1, . . . , dm are all 1-linear structures
for some invariant g with LS(g) ⊇WL(D). One can now consider
D′ = {d1 +L(d1), d2 +L(d2), . . . , dm+L(dm), dm+1, . . . , dt, d1 +d2, . . . , d1 +dm}
which increases the dimension of WL(D
′) by adding the sums of the 1-linear
structures. We then have WL(D
′) ⊆ LS0(g) and we can apply Algo. 1 on Z =
WL(D
′). Since we cannot say in advance which of the constants are 1-linear
structures, there are 2t possible choices of such a subspace WL(D
′) and we run
Algo. 1 on all of them. This approach still might be very inefficient due to the
smaller dimension of WL(D
′) and since Algo. 1 has to be run 2t times.
Second approach. If the S-box layer S of the cipher has an odd-length cycle (i.e.,
if every S-box has an odd-length cycle), we can come up with the following.
Proposition 4. Let g ∈ U(S) where S is an n-bit permutation with an odd cycle.
Then, any linear structure of g which belongs to the image set of (S + Idn), i.e.,
{S(x) + x | x ∈ Fn2}, is a 0-linear structure of g.
Proof. If the S-box layer has an odd cycle, then any g ∈ U(S) necessarily fulfills
g(x) = g(S(x)) for all x ∈ Fn2 . Now let g ∈ U(S) and c ∈ LS(g). This linear
structure belongs to Im(S + Idn) if there exists x0 ∈ Fn2 such that S(x0) = x0 + c.
We then deduce that
g(x0) = g(S(x0)) = g(x0 + c) ,
implying that c is a 0-linear structure of g. ut
Therefore, if we find enough of these c ∈ WL(D) ∩ Im(S + Idn), we can just
apply Algorithm 1 on the resulting set. This approach will be used on Mantis7,
as explained in the next section.
3.3 Results for some Lightweight Ciphers
Prince. For Prince, we apply the first approach to D′ = {d + L(d), d ∈ D}
where
D = {α,RC1 + RC2,RC1 + RC3,RC1 + RC4,RC1 + RC5} .
Then, dimWL(D
′) = 51. We run Algorithm 1 on WL(D′) and the algorithm
terminates within a few minutes on a standard PC. We now have proven that
there are no non-trivial invariants that are invariant for both the substitution
layer and the linear parts of all rounds in Prince.
Mantis. Since dimWL(D) = 42 for Mantis7, applying our algorithm 2
7 times
on a subspace of codimension 23 is a quite expensive task. We therefore exploit
Prop. 4. Indeed, the S-box layer of Mantis is the parallel application of the
following 4-bit S-box Sb.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
Sb(x) c a d 3 e b f 7 8 9 1 5 0 2 4 6
x+ Sb(x) c b f 0 a e 9 0 0 0 b e c f a 9
The S-box layer has an odd cycle because Sb has a fixed point. Moreover, the
image set of (Sb+ Id4) is composed of 7 values {0, 9, a, b, c, e, f}. The c ∈WL(D)
for which each nibble is equal to a value in Im(Sb+ Id4) is a 0-linear structure. For
a random value c ∈ F642 , we expect that every nibble belongs to Im(Sb+ Id4) with
a probability of
(
7
16
)16 ≈ 2−19.082. In fact, one can find enough such c ∈WL(D)
in a reasonable time that generate the whole invariant space WL(D), implying
that WL(D) ⊆ LS0(g) for all invariants g ∈ U(S). We then run Algorithm 1 on
Z = WL(D). The algorithm terminates and we therefore deduce the non-existence
of any non-trivial invariant which is invariant for S and the linear parts of all
rounds in Mantis7.
Midori-64. For Midori-64, WL(D) = {0000, 0001}16 and has dimension 16 only.
Then, there are 248 different cosets of WL(D), implying that our algorithm is
not efficient. Instead, we can theoretically describe the supports of all invariants
of Midori-64. The proof of the following proposition is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 5. Let S be the substitution layer in Midori-64. Let further W =
{0000, 0001}16. Let g ∈ B64. Then, g ∈ U(S) and W ⊆ LS(g) if and only if the
support of g is defined by
Supp(g) =
⋃
b0...b31∈Supp(h)
Hb0b1 ×Hb2b3 × . . .×Hb30b31
where h is any Boolean function of 32 variables such that {00, 10}16 ⊆ LS(h) and
the sets Hab are defined by
H00 = {8}, H10 = {9}, H01 = {0, 3, 5, 6, b, c, f} and H11 = {1, 2, 4, 7, a, d, e} .
The invariant g1 exploited in the invariant subspace attack described in [11]
is defined by supp(g1) = {8, 9}16. In our characterization, it corresponds to
h(b0, . . . , b31) =
15∏
i=0
(1 + b2i+1) .
In this case, all elements in {00, 10}16 are 0-linear structures for h, implying that
all elements in WL(D) are 0-linear structures for g1. If we denote the bits in the
j-th cell of the Midori-64 state by xj,3, xj,2, xj,1, xj,0 (the lsb corresponds to xj,0),
the algebraic normal form of g1 is
g1(x) =
16∏
j=1
(xj,1xj,2xj,3 + xj,1xj,3 + xj,2xj,3 + xj,3) ,
since x1x2x3 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x3 is the ANF of the 4-variable function with
support H00 ∪H10.
The quadratic nonlinear invariant described in [21] is given by
g2(x) =
16∑
j=1
(xj,3xj,2 + xj,2 + xj,1 + xj,0) .
It corresponds to h(b0, . . . , b31) =
∑15
i=0 b2i . In this second case, only the words
in WL(D) with an even number of non-zero nibbles are 0-linear structures for g2.
It is worth noticing that the sum of these two invariants (g1 + g2) leads to a new
invariant of degree 48 which has a linear space of dimension 32. However, as this
invariant does not admit any new weak keys, it does not lead to an improved
attack on Midori-64.
4 Design Criteria on the Linear Layer and on the Round
Constants
In this section, we study the properties of WL(D) in more detail and explain
the different behaviors which have been previously observed. Most notably, we
would like to determine whether the differences in the dimensions of WL(D) we
noticed are due to a bad choice of the round constants or if they are inherent to
the choice of the linear layer. At this aim, we analyze the possible values for the
dimension of WL(D) from a more theoretical viewpoint. We first consider the
L-invariant subspace WL(c) generated by a single element c. It is worth noticing
that all results obtained in this section hold for any Fq-linear layer operating
on Fnq , where q is any prime power. But, for the sake of simplicity, they are
formulated for q = 2 only, which is the case of all ciphers we are considering.
4.1 The Possible Dimensions of WL(c)
We show that, for a single element c, the dimension of WL(c) is upper-bounded
by the degree of the minimal polynomial of the linear layer, defined as follows.
Definition 3. (e.g., [9, Page 176]) Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . The
minimal polynomial of L is the monic polynomial MinL(X) =
∑d
i=0 piX
i ∈ F2[x]
of smallest degree such that
MinL(L) =
d∑
i=0
piL
i = 0 .
Moreover, the minimal annihilating polynomial of an element c ∈ Fn2 (w.r.t
L) (aka the order polynomial of c or simply the minimal polynomial of c) is the
monic polynomial ordL(c)(X) =
∑d
i=0 πiX
i ∈ F2[x] of smallest degree such that
d∑
i=0
πi(L
i(c)) = 0 .
Proposition 6. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . For any non-zero c ∈ Fn2 ,
the dimension of WL(c) is the degree of the minimal polynomial of c.
Proof. We know from Lemma 1 that WL(c) is spanned by all L
i(c), i ≥ 0. Let d
be the smallest integer such that {c, L(c), . . . , Ld−1(c)} are linearly independent.
By definition, d corresponds the degree of the minimal polynomial of c since
the fact that Ld(c) belongs to 〈Li(c), 0 ≤ i < d〉 is equivalent to the existence
of π0, . . . , πd−1 ∈ F2 such that Ld(c) =
∑d−1
i=0 πiL
i(c), i.e., P (L)(c) = 0 with
P (X) = Xd +
∑d−1
i=0 πiX
i. It follows that d ≤ dimWL(c).
We now need to prove that d = dimWL(c), i.e., that all L
d+t(c) for t ≥ 0
belong to the linear subspace spanned by {c, L(c), . . . , Ld−1(c)}. This can be
proved by induction on t. The property holds for t = 0 by definition of d. Suppose
now that Ld+t(c) ∈ 〈c, L(c), . . . , Ld−1(c)〉. Then,
Ld+t+1(c) = L
(
Ld+t(c)
)
= L
(
d−1∑
i=0
λiL
i(c)
)
=
d−1∑
i=0
λiL
i+1(c) ∈ 〈c, . . . , Ld−1(c)〉 .
ut
Obviously, the minimal polynomial of c is a divisor of the minimal polynomial
of L. The previous proposition then provides an upper bound on the dimension
of any subspace WL(c), for c ∈ Fn2 \ {0}.
Corollary 1. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . For any c ∈ Fn2 , the dimension
of WL(c) is at most the degree of the minimal polynomial of L.
We can even get a more precise result and show that the possible values for the
dimension of WL(c) correspond to the degrees of the divisors of MinL. Moreover,
there are some elements c which lead to any of these values. In particular, the
degree of MinL can always be achieved. This result can be proven in a constructive
way by using the representation of the associated matrix as a block diagonal
matrix whose diagonal consists of companion matrices.
Definition 4. Let g(X) = Xd +
∑d−1
i=0 giX
i be a monic polynomial in F2[X]. Its
companion matrix is the d× d matrix defined by
C(g) =

0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
...
0 0 0 . . . 1
g0 g1 g2 . . . gd−1

Let us first focus on the special case when the minimal polynomial of L has
degree n. Then there is a basis such that the matrix of L is the companion matrix
of MinL (e.g., [13, Lemma 6.7.1]). Using this property, we can prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 corresponding to the multi-
plication by some companion matrix C(Q) with Q ∈ F2[X] of degree n. For any
non-constant divisor P of Q in F2[X], there exists c ∈ Fn2 such that ordL(c) = P .
Proof. When the matrix of the linear permutation we consider is a companion
matrix C(Q), then the elements in the cycle of c, {c, L(c), L2(c), . . .}, can be
seen as the successive internal states of the n-bit LFSR with characteristic
polynomial Q and initial state c. It follows that ordL(c) corresponds to the
minimal polynomial of the sequence produced by the LFSR with characteristic
polynomial Q and initial state c (see [18, Th. 8.51]). On the other hand, it is
well-known that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sequences
(st)t≥0 produced by the LFSR with characteristic polynomial Q and the set of
polynomials C ∈ F2[X] with degC < degQ [18, Th. 8.40]. This comes from the
fact that the generating function of any LFSR sequence can be written as
∑
t≥0
stX
t =
C(X)
Q∗(X)
,
where Q∗ denotes the reciprocal of polynomial Q, i.e., Q∗(X) = XdegQQ(1/X),
and C is defined by the LFSR initial state.
Let now P be any non-constant divisor of Q, i.e., Q(X) = P (X)R(X) with
P 6= 1. Then, the reciprocal polynomials satisfy Q∗(X) = P ∗(X)R∗(X). It follows
that, for C(X) = R∗(X),
C(X)
Q∗(X)
=
1
P ∗(X)
.
Therefore, the sequence generated from the initial state defined by C = R∗ has
minimal polynomial P . This is equivalent to the fact that the order polynomial
of this initial state equals P . ut
When the degree of the minimal polynomial of the linear layer is smaller
than the block size, the previous result can be generalized by representing L by
a block diagonal matrix whose diagonal is composed of companion matrices. It
leads to the following general result on the possible dimensions of WL(c).
Proposition 8. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 and MinL be its minimal
polynomial. Then, for any divisor P of MinL, there exists c ∈ Fn2 such that
dimWL(c) = degP .
Most notably,
max
c∈Fn2
dimWL(c) = degMinL .
Proof. If P equals the constant polynomial of degree zero, i.e., P = 1, we choose
c = 0. Therefore, we assume in the following that P is of positive degree.
Let us factor the minimal polynomial of L in
MinL(X) = M1(X)
e1M2(X)
e2 . . .Mk(X)
ek
where M1, . . . , Mk are distinct irreducible polynomials over F2. From Theo-
rem 6.7.1 and its corollary in [13], Fn2 can be decomposed into a direct sum of
L-invariant subspaces
Fn2 =
k⊕
i=1
ri⊕
j=1
Vi,j
such that the matrix of the linear transformation induced by L on Vi,j is the
companion matrix of M
`i,j
i where the `i,j are integers such that `i,1 = ei (the
polynomials M
`i,j
i are called the elementary divisors of L). Let now P be a
non-constant divisor of MinL. Thus, we assume w.l.o.g that
P (X) = M1(X)
a1M2(X)
a2 . . .Mκ(X)
aκ with 1 ≤ ai ≤ ei .
Since each Maii is a non-constant divisor of M
ei
i , we know from Proposition 7
that there exists ui ∈ Vi,1 such that ordLi(ui) = M
ai
i , where Li denotes the
linear transformation induced by L on Vi,1. Let us now consider the element
c ∈
⊕κ
i=1 Vi,1 defined by c =
∑κ
i=1 ui. Let π0, . . . πd−1 ∈ F2 such that R(X) :=
Xd +
∑d−1
t=0 πtX
t equals the order polynomial of c. In particular,
Ld(c) =
d−1∑
t=0
πtL
t(c) .
Using that Lt(c) =
∑κ
i=1 L
t(ui) and the direct sum property, we deduce that,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ κ,
Ld(ui) =
d−1∑
t=0
πtL
t(ui) .
Then, R is a multiple of the order polynomials of all ui. It follows that R must
be a multiple of lcm(Maii ) = P . Since P (L(c)) = 0, we deduce that the order
polynomial of c is equal to P . ut
LED. The minimal polynomial of the linear layer in LED is
MinL(X) = (X
8 +X7 +X5 +X3 + 1)4(X8 +X7 +X6 +X5 +X2 +X + 1)4 .
Since its degree equals the block size, we deduce from the previous proposition
that there exists an element c ∈ F642 such that WL(c) covers the whole space.
Skinny. The linear layer in Skinny with a 16s-bit state, s ∈ {4, 8}, is an F2s-
linear permutation of (F2s)16 defined by a (16× 16) matrix M with coefficients
in F2. Moreover, the multiplicative order of this matrix in GL(16,F2) equals 16,
implying that the minimal polynomial of L is a divisor of X16 + 1. It can actually
be checked that (M + Id16)
e 6= 0 for all e < 16, implying that
MinL(X) = X
16 + 1 = (X + 1)16 .
It follows that there exist some elements c ∈ (F2s)16 such that dimWL(c) = d for
any value of d between 1 and 16. Elements c which generate a subspace WL(c)
of given dimension can be easily exhibited using the construction detailed in the
proof of Prop. 7. Indeed, up to a change of basis, the matrix of L in GL(16,F2)
corresponds to the companion matrix of (X16 + 1), i.e., to a mere rotation of
16-bit vectors. In other words, we can find a matrix U ∈ GL(16,F2) such that
M = U ×C(X16 + 1)×U−1. Let us now consider elements c ∈ (F2s)16 for which
only the least significant bits of the cells can take non-zero values. Let b be the
16-bit vector corresponding to these least significant bits, then dimWL(c) = d
where d is the length of the shortest LFSR generating b′ = U−1b. Table 1 provides
some examples of such elements for various dimensions.
Table 1: Examples of c ∈ (F2s)16 and the corresponding dimensions of WL(c).
U−1 × b b dimWL(c)
1111111111111111 0011001100110011 1
1010101010101010 1111111111111111 2
1100110011001100 1001100110011001 3
1000100010001000 1011101110111011 4
1000000000000000 1111010111110001 16
Prince. The minimal polynomial of the linear layer in Prince is
MinL(X) = X
20 +X18 +X16 +X14 +X12 +X8 +X6 +X4 +X2 + 1
= (X4 +X3 +X2 +X + 1)2(X2 +X + 1)4(X + 1)4 .
The maximal dimension of WL(c) is then 20 and the factorization of MinL shows
that there exist elements which generate subspaces of much lower dimension.
Mantis and Midori-64. Mantis and Midori-64 share the same linear layer,
which has minimal polynomial
MinL(X) = (X + 1)
6 .
We deduce that dimWL(c) ≤ 6.
4.2 Considering More Round Constants
We can now consider more than one round constant and determine the maximum
dimension of WL(c1, . . . , ct) spanned by t elements. This value is related to the
so-called invariant factor form (aka rational canonical form) of the linear layer,
as defined in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. (Invariant factors)[8, Page 476] Let L be a linear permutation
of Fn2 . A basis of Fn2 can be found in which the matrix of L is of the form
C(Qr)
C(Qr−1)
. . .
C(Q1)

for polynomials Qi such that Qr | Qr−1 | · · · | Q1. The polynomial Q1 equals the
minimal polynomial of L. In this decomposition, the Qi are called the invariant
factors of L.
The invariant factors of the linear layer then define the maximal value of
WL(c1, . . . , ct), as stated in Theorem 1 which we restate below. A complete proof
is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let Q1, . . . , Qr be the invariant factors of the linear layer L and
let t ≤ r. Then
max
c1,...,ct∈Fn2
dimWL(c1, . . . , ct) =
t∑
i=1
degQi .
Most notably, the minimal number of elements that must be considered in D
in order to generate a space WL(D) of full dimension is equal to the number of
invariant factors of the linear layer.
Prince. The linear layer of Prince has 8 invariant factors:
Q1(X) = Q2(X) = MinL(X)
= X20 +X18 +X16 +X14 +X12 +X8 +X6 +X4 +X2 + 1
Q3(X) = Q4(X) = X
8 +X6 +X2 + 1 = (X + 1)4(X2 +X + 1)2
Q5(X) = Q6(X) = Q7(X) = Q8(X) = (X + 1)
2
Then, from any set D with 5 elements, the maximal dimension we can get for
WL(D) is 20+20+8+8+2 = 58, while we get 56 for the particular D derived from
the effective round constants D = {α,RC1 + RC2,RC1 + RC3,RC1 + RC4,RC1 +
RC5}. We can then see that the round constants are not optimal, but that we
can never achieve the full dimension with the number of rounds used in Prince.
Mantis and Midori-64. The linear layer of Mantis (resp. Midori-64) has 16 in-
variant factors:
Q1(X) = . . . , Q8(X) = (X + 1)
6 and Q9(X) = . . . , Q16(X) = (X + 1)
2 .
From the set D of size 7 (resp. 8) obtained from the actual round constants of
Mantis7 (resp. Mantis8), we generate a space WL(D) of dimension 42 (resp. 48)
which is then optimal. We also see that one needs at least 16 round constant
differences c1, . . . , c16 to cover the whole input space. It is worth noticing that
the round constants in Midori are only non-zero on the least significant bit in each
cell, implying that WL(D) has dimension at most 16. This is the main weakness
of Midori-64 with respect to invariant attacks and this explains why the use of
the same linear in Mantis does not lead to a similar attack.
The maximal dimension we can reach from a given number of round constants
for the linear layers of Prince and of Mantis is then depicted in Fig. 1 in Section 1.
4.3 Choosing Random Round Constants
Often, the round constants of a cipher are chosen randomly. In this section, we
want to compute the probability that a set of uniformly random chosen elements
D generates a space WL(D) of maximal dimension. Again, we first consider the
case of a single constant, i.e., D = {c}.
Proposition 10. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . Assume that
MinL(X) = M1(X)
e1M2(X)
e2 . . .Mk(X)
ek
where M1, . . . , Mk are distinct irreducible polynomials over F2. Then, the proba-
bility for a uniformly chosen c ∈ Fn2 to obtain dimWL(c) = degMinL is
Pr
c
$←Fn2
[dimWL(c) = degMinL] =
k∏
i=1
(
1− 1
2µi degMi
)
,
where µi is the number of invariant factors of L which are multiples of M
ei
i .
Proof. We use the decomposition based on the elementary divisors, as in the
proof of Prop. 8. From [13, Page 308], Fn2 can be decomposed into a direct sum
Fn2 =
k⊕
i=1
ri⊕
j=1
Vi,j
such that the matrix of the linear transformation induced by L on Vi,j is the
companion matrix of Mi(X)
`i,j where, for each i, the `i,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ ri, form
a decreasing sequence of integers such that `i,1 = ei. Then, the minimal poly-
nomial of any element u in Vi,j is a divisor of Mi(X)
`i,j . It follows that, if
c =
∑k
i=1
∑ri
j=1 ui,j ∈
⊕k
i=1
⊕ri
j=1 Vi,j , ordL(c) = MinL if and only if, for any i,
there exists an index j such that ordL(ui,j) = M
ei
i . Obviously, this situation can
only occur if `i,j = ei. This last condition is equivalent to the fact that j ≤ µi,
where µi = max{j : `i,j = ei}. Using that the invariant factors of L are related
to the decomposition of MinL by
Qv =
k∏
i=1
M
`i,v
i
where `i,v = 0 if v > ri, we deduce that µi is the number of invariant factors Qv
which are multiples of Meii . Let us now define the event
Ei,j : ordL(ui,j) = M
`i,j
i .
Then, we have
Pr
c
$←Fn2
[dimWL(c) = degMinL] =
k∏
i=1
Pr
 µi⋃
j=1
Ei,j
 .
It is important to note that for a fixed i, the probability of the event Ei,j is the
same for all j. This probability corresponds to the proportion of polynomials of
degree less than deg(M
`i,j
i ) which are coprime to M
`i,j
i . Indeed, as noticed in the
proof of Prop 7, there is a correspondence between the elements in Vi,j and the
initial states of the LFSR with characteristic polynomial M
`i,j
i . Recall that the
number of polynomials coprime to a given polynomial P is
φ(P ) := |{f ∈ F2[X] | deg(f) < deg(P ), gcd(f, P ) = 1}| .
If P is irreducible, then for any power of P we have φ(P k) = 2(k−1) degP (2degP−1).
We then deduce that
Pr[Ei,j ] =
φ(M
`i,j
i )
2`i,j degMi
=
2(`i,j−1) degMi(2degMi − 1)
2`i,j ·degMi
= 1− 1
2degMi
.
To compute Pr[
⋃µi
j=1Ei,j ], we use the inclusion-exclusion principle and obtain
Pr
 µi⋃
j=1
Ei,j
 = µi∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
(
µi
j
)(
1− 1
2degMi
)j
=
(
1− 1
2µi degMi
)
.
ut
LED. The minimal polynomial of the linear layer in LED is
MinL(X) = (X
8 +X7 +X5 +X3 + 1)4(X8 +X7 +X6 +X5 +X2 +X + 1)4 .
A single constant c is sufficient to generate the whole space. Since MinL has two
irreducible factors, each of of degree 8, we get from the previous proposition that
the probability that WL(c) = F642 for a uniformly chosen constant c is
Pr[WL(c) = F642 ] = (1− 2−8)2 ≈ 0.9922 .
Probability to generate the whole space with several random con-
stants. We now give a formula for the probability to get the maximal dimension
with t randomly chosen round elements, when t varies. This probability highly
depends on the degrees of the irreducible factors of the minimal polynomial of L.
A full proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . Assume that
MinL(X) = M1(X)
e1M2(X)
e2 . . .Mk(X)
ek
where M1, . . . , Mk are distinct irreducible polynomials over F2. Then, the proba-
bility that WL(c1, · · · , ct) equals Fn2 is
Pr
c1,...,ct
$←Fn2
[WL(c1, · · · , ct) = Fn2 ] =
k∏
j=1
rj−1∏
ij=0
(
1− 1
2(t−ij) deg(Mj)
)
,
where rj is the number of invariant factors of L which are multiples of Mj.
It is worth noticing that, when t < r with r the number of invariant factors,
the product equals zero which corresponds to the fact that we need at least
r constants to generate the whole space.
Prince. Recall that the minimal polynomial of the linear layer in Prince is
MinL(X) = X
20 +X18 +X16 +X14 +X12 +X8 +X6 +X4 +X2 + 1
= (X4 +X3 +X2 +X + 1)2(X2 +X + 1)4(X + 1)4 .
It then has three irreducible factors
M1(X) = X
4 +X3 +X2 +X + 1,M2(X) = X
2 +X + 1 and M3(X) = (X + 1) .
Moreover, we know that the eight invariant factors of L are
Q1(X) = Q2(X) = MinL(X) ,
Q3(X) = Q4(X) = (X + 1)
4(X2 +X + 1)2 ,
Q5(X) = Q6(X) = Q7(X) = Q8(X) = (X + 1)
2 .
We then deduce that µ1 = 2, µ2 = 2 and µ3 = 4. Prop. 10 then implies that
dimWL(c) ≤ 20 and
Pr[dimWL(c) = 20] = (1− 2−8)(1− 2−4)2 ≈ 0.8755
for a uniformly chosen c. Since L has 8 invariant factors, at least t = 8 elements
c1, . . . , c8 are needed to reach WL(c1, . . . , ct) = F642 . The number of invariant
factors in which each of the Mi appears is given by r1 = 2, r2 = 4 and r3 = 8.
From Theorem 2, we get that the probability that WL(c1, . . . , c8) = F642 is
1∏
i=0
(
1− 2−(8−i)·4
)
×
3∏
i=0
(
1− 2−(8−i)·2
) 7∏
i=0
(
1− 2−(8−i)
)
' 0.2895 .
Mantis and Midori-64. The minimal polynomial of the linear layer of Man-
tis and Midori-64 has a single irreducible factor, which is (X + 1). This linear
layer has 16 invariant factors. Since the first 8 invariant factors equal the minimal
polynomial, which has degree 6, we derive from Prop. 10 that the probability
that a uniformly chosen element generates a subspace of dimension 6 is
Pr[dimWL(c) = 6] = (1− 2−8) ≈ 0.9961 .
We need at least 16 elements c1, . . . , c16 to cover the whole space and this occurs
with probability
16∏
j=1
(
1− 1
2j
)
' 0.28879 .
It is worth noticing that when we increase the number of random round constants
from 16 to 20, this probability increases to 0.93879.
Figure 2 in Section 1 shows how the probability that the whole space is covered
increases with the number of randomly chosen elements, for the linear layers
of LED, Skinny-64, Prince and Mantis. The fact that the curve corresponding to
Skinny-64, Prince and Mantis have a similar shape comes from the fact that all
three linear layers have a minimal polynomial divisible by (X+1), and this factor
appears in all invariant factors. Then, the term corresponding to the irreducible
factor of degree 1, namely
t∏
j=t−r+1
(
1− 1
2j
)
is the dominant term in the formula in Theorem 2. Most notably, for t = r, the
probability is close to (1− 2−1)(1− 2−2)(1− 2−3)(1− 2−4) ' 0.3.
5 Conclusion
For lightweight substitution-permutation ciphers with a simple key schedule, we
provided a detailed analysis on the impact of the design of the linear layer and the
particular choice of the round constants to the applicability of both the invariant
subspace attack and the recently published nonlinear invariant attack. We did
this analysis in a framework which unifies both of these attacks as so-called
invariant attacks. With an algorithmic approach, a designer is now able to easily
check the soundness of the chosen round constants, in combination with the
choice of the linear layer, with regard to the resistance against invariant attacks
and can thus easily avoid possible weaknesses by design. We stress that in many
cases, this analysis can be done independently of the choice of the substitution
layer. We directly applied our methods to several existing lightweight ciphers and
showed in particular why Skinny-64-64, Prince, and Mantis7 are secure against
invariant attacks; unless the adversary exploits weaknesses which are not based
on weaknesses of the underlying building blocks, i.e., substitution layer and linear
layer. In fact, we are not aware of any such strong attacks in the literature.
As future work, one can think about further generalizations of invariant
attacks. As it was already mentioned in [21], it would be interesting to know
if one can make use of statistical invariant attacks, i.e., invariant attacks that
only work with a certain probability instead for all possible plaintexts. A further
generalization could consider different invariants for the particular building blocks
in each round of the analyzed primitive.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In the whole section, we represent L in invariant factor form as in Prop. 9.
We denote by V1, . . . , Vr the invariant subspaces such that Fn2 =
⊕r
i=1 Vi and
the linear transformation induced by L on Vi, denoted L|Vi , is represented by
the companion matrix C(Qi). We define eVi as the first unit vector in Vi, i.e.,
Vi = 〈Lk(eVi), 0 ≤ k < degQi〉 and ordL|Vi (eVi) = Qi. Using Prop. 7, one can
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let t ≤ r. Then
max
c1,...,ct∈Fnq
dimWL(c1, . . . , ct) ≥
t∑
i=1
degQi .
Proof. We choose c1 = eV1 and obtain WL(c1) = WL|V1 (c1) = V1. Then dimV1
equals degQ1. We now continue with L|V2⊕···⊕Vm which has minimal polynomial
Q2 and choose c2 accordingly. Iterating this until ct, we construct WL(c1, . . . , ct)
as the direct sum
⊕t
i=1WL(ci) which has dimension
∑t
i=1 degQi. ut
In order to prove equality, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let c in Fn2 =
⊕r
j=1 Vj be represented as c =
∑
j∈J uj with J ⊆
{1, . . . , r} and uj ∈ Vj \ {0}. Then WL(c) ⊆WL(c̄) with c̄ :=
∑
j∈J eVj .
Proof. Let v ∈WL(c). Then
v =
∑
i∈N
αiL
i(c) =
∑
i∈N
αiL
i(
∑
j∈J
uj) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈J
αiL
i(uj)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈J
αiL
i(
∑
k∈N
βkL
k(eVj)) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈N
αiβkL
i+k(eVj)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈N
αiβkL
i+k(
∑
j∈J
eVj) =
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈N
αiβkL
i+k(c̄) ∈WL(c̄) .
ut
This implies that for any c1, . . . , ct ∈ Fn2 , it is WL(c1, . . . , ct) ⊆WL(c̄1, . . . , c̄t).
Thus, we can assume w.l.o.g. that all ci are of the form c̄i =
∑r
j=1 γijeVj with
γij ∈ F2. Then, to any t-tuple (c1, . . . , ct) ∈ (Fn2 )t where each ci is of the form
described above, we associate a t× t matrix M(c1,...,ct) := [γij ]i,j over Fn2 .
Lemma 5. Let (c1, . . . , ct) ∈ (Fn2 )t be such that ci =
∑r
j=1 γijeVj and let
M(c′1,...,c′t) be any matrix obtained from M(c1,...,ct) by elementary row operations.
Then, for (c′1, . . . , c
′
t) corresponding to M(c′1,...,c′t), we have
WL(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
t) = WL(c1, . . . , ct) .
Proof. For a t× t matrix over F2, an elementary row operation is either
(i) a swap of two different rows or
(ii) an addition of one row to another.
Transforming a matrix M(c1,...,cr,...,cs,...,ct) by operation (i) results in the matrix
M(c1,...,cs,...,cr,...,ct) and obviously
∑t
i=1WL(ci) is commutative.
We therefore only have to show that for two constants cr, cs the equality
WL(cr)+WL(cs) = WL(cr+cs)+WL(cs) holds. Let v ∈WL(cr)+WL(cs). Then,
u =
∑
i∈N
(αiL
i(cr) + βiL
i(cs)) =
∑
i∈N
(αiL
i(cr) + αiL
i(cs) + αiL
i(cs) + βiL
i(cs))
=
∑
i∈N
(αiL
i(cr + cs) + (αi + βi)L
i(cs)) ∈WL(cr + cs) +WL(cs) .
The other inclusion ⊇ follows accordingly. ut
Now, we can prove the main theorem.
Proof (of Theorem 1). The only thing left to show is ≤. Given c1, . . . , ct ∈ Fn2
with t ≤ r. By Lemma 4, WL(c1, . . . , ct) ⊆ WL(c̄1, . . . , c̄t) for appropriate c̄i =∑r
j=1 γijeVj with γij ∈ F2.
Consider the matrix M(c̄1,...,c̄t). Using elementary row operations, one can
bring M(c̄1,...,c̄t) in reduced row-echelon form M(c̃1,...,c̃t). Now, by Lemma 5,
the c̃i are such that WL(c̄1, . . . c̄t) = WL(c̃1, . . . , c̃t) and, most importantly,
WL(c̃1, . . . , c̃t) =
∑t
i=1WL|Vi⊕···⊕Vr (c̃i). This is because c̃i =
∑r
j=1 γ̃ijeVj has
γ̃ij = 0 for all j < i.
Since the minimal polynomial of L|Vi⊕···⊕Vr equals Qi, one finally obtains:
dimWL(c1, . . . , ct) ≤ dimWL(c̄1, . . . , c̄t) = dim
t∑
i=1
WL|Vi⊕···⊕Vr (c̃i) ≤
t∑
i=1
degQi
ut
B Proof of Theorem 2
We now compute the probability to get the maximal dimension with t randomly
chosen elements, when t varies. We need two preliminary results. The first one
focuses on the case when MinL is a power of an irreducible polynomial.
Proposition 11. Let V be any vector space over F2. Let L be a linear application
from V into V with exactly r invariant factors, such that the minimal polynomial
of L is of the form P e where P is an irreducible polynomial. Then, the probability
that WL(c1, · · · , ct) equals V is
Pr
c1,...,ct
$←V [WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V ] =
r−1∏
i=0
(
1− 1
2(t−i) deg(P )
)
Proof. Let P e1 , . . . , P er with e = e1 ≥ e2 . . . ≥ er be the invariant factors
of L. Then, V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vr where L|Vi is represented by the companion
matrix C(P ei). Therefore, for each ci ∈ V , there exist (ui,1, ui,2, · · · , ui,r) ∈
V1 × V2 × · · · × Vr such that ci = ui,1 + ui,2 + · · ·+ ui,r .
We first prove that if WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V , there exists some constant ci,
1 ≤ i ≤ t, such that WL(ui,1) = V1. Obviously, the ui,j for j ≥ 2 do not belong
to the subspace V1. Then, if WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V , WL((ui,1)1≤i≤t) must cover
the whole space V1. Moreover, if ui,1 and uj,1 are such that WL(ui,1) ( V1 and
WL(uj,1) ( V1, then WL(ui,1, uj,1) ( V1. Indeed, since WL(ui,1) ( V1, the order
polynomial of ui,1 with respect to L equals P
a, for some a < e1. Similarly, the
order polynomial of uj,1 equals P
b, for some b < e1. Assume w.l.o.g that a ≤ b.
It is well known that, for any linear application M and any integer `, we have
ker(M `) ⊆ ker(M `+1). Here, we apply this to the linear application M = P (L):
Using that WL(ui,1) ⊆ ker(P a(L)) and WL(uj,1) ⊆ ker(P b(L)), we deduce that
WL(ui,1) ⊆ ker(P a(L)) ⊆ ker(P b(L)) ( V1
and thus
WL(ui,1, uj,1) ⊆ ker(P b(L)) ( V1 .
This eventually implies that at least one of the WL(ui,1) must cover V1.
We now prove the result by induction on r, the number of invariant factors.
– r = 1. From the previous observation, WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V if and only if at
least one of the c1, . . . , ct has order polynomial P
e. We have seen in Prop. 10
that the probability that a random c ∈ V has order polynomial P e is
1− 1
2degP
.
Then, since the t constants are independent, the probability that none of the
t constants has minimal polynomial P e equals (2− degP )t, implying that
Pr
c1,...,ct
$←V [WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V ] = 1−
1
2t deg(P )
.
– Induction step. We now assume that the result holds for any linear ap-
plication with (r − 1) invariant factors and whose minimal polynomial is
a power of an irreducible polynomial. Let us consider L with r invariant
factors. If WL(c1, · · · , ct) = V , then at least one of the t constants satisfies
WL(ui,1) = V1. This occurs with probability 1 − 12t deg(P ) . Once we found
the constant, say c1, such that WL(u1,1) = V1, we need to focus on the
application defined on the quotient space, L′ = V/WL(c1). Since the order
polynomial of c1 is the minimal polynomial of L, then the invariant factors
of L′ are P e2 , . . . , P er (see e.g., [10, Fact 2.2]). Then we have
Pr[WL(c1, · · · , ct) = Fn2 ] =
(
1− 1
2t deg(P )
)
Pr[WL′(c
′
2, · · · , c′t) = V/V1]
where c′i = (ci)Fn2 /V1 . The result then follows from the induction hypothesis
applied to L′, which has (r − 1) invariant factors. ut
The general case can now be tackled thanks to the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let L be a linear permutation of Fn2 . Suppose that there exist two
subspaces of Fn2 , V1 and V2, invariant under L such that V1 ⊕ V2 = Fn2 and the
minimal polynomials of the linear transformations induced by L on V1 and on V2
are coprime. Then, for any c1, . . . , ct ∈ Fn2 ,
WL(c1, . . . , ct) = WL(a1, . . . , at)⊕WL(b1, . . . , bt)
where (ai, bi) is the unique pair in V1 × V2 such that ci = ai + bi.
Proof. First we observe that WL(a1, . . . , at) ∩ WL(b1, . . . , bt) = {0}. Indeed,
WL(a1, . . . , at) ⊆ V1 and WL(b1, . . . , bt) ⊆ V2 because V1 and V2 are invariant
under L.
It is easy to check that WL(c1, . . . , ct) ⊆ WL(a1, . . . , at) ⊕ WL(b1, . . . , bt).
Actually, any x ∈WL(c1, . . . , ct) can be expressed as
x =
∑
`∈N
t∑
i=1
λi,`L
`(ci) =
(∑
`∈N
t∑
i=1
λi,`L
`(ai)
)
+
(∑
`∈N
t∑
i=1
λi,`L
`(bi)
)
.
We now need to show that WL(a1, . . . , at)⊕WL(b1, . . . , bt) ⊆WL(c1, . . . , ct).
Let P1 and P2 respectively denote the minimal polynomials of the applications
L1 and L2 induced by L on V1 and on V2. Let d1 and d2 denote the degree of P1
and P2 respectively. Let us consider the following subspace of Fn2 :
W =
〈
P2(L
j)(ci), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d1
〉
+
〈
P1(L
j)(ci), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d2
〉
.
Since each P1(L
j)(ci) (resp. each P2(L
j)(ci)) is a linear combination of elements
of the form L`(ci), it is clear that W ⊆ WL(c1, . . . , ct). On the other hand, for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ t and any 0 ≤ j < d1, we have
P2(L
j)(ci) = P2(L
j)(ai + bi) = P2(L
j)(ai) + P2(L
j)(bi) = P2(L
j)(ai) ,
since bi ∈ V2 and P2(Xj) is a multiple of the minimal polynomial of L2. Similarly,
P1(L
j)(ci) = P1(L
j)(bi) ,
implying that
W =
〈
P2(L
j)(ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d1
〉
+
〈
P1(L
j)(bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d2
〉
.
Moreover, the following mapping
φ1 : V1 → V1
x 7→ P2(L)(x)
is a bijection since it is linear and its kernel is equal to the all-zero vector. Indeed,
if P2(L)(x) = 0, then ordL(x) is a divisor of P2. But, since x ∈ V1, we know that
ordL(x) is a divisor of P1. Using that P1 and P2 are coprime, we get that x is the
all-zero vector. Moreover, WL(a1, . . . , at) is invariant under φ1. It follows that〈
P2(L
j)(ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d1
〉
= P2(L)
(〈
Lj(ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d1
〉)
= φ1(WL(a1, . . . , at)) = WL(a1, . . . , at) .
Similarly, 〈
P1(L
j)(bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 0 ≤ j < d2
〉
= WL(b1, . . . , bt) .
We eventually deduce that
W = WL(a1, . . . , at)⊕WL(b1, . . . , bt) .
Combined with the fact that W ⊆WL(c1, . . . , ct), it leads to
WL(a1, . . . , at)⊕WL(b1, . . . , bt) ⊆WL(c1, . . . , ct) .
ut
The combination of the previous two results leads to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Let us decompose the minimal polynomial of L as
MinL(X) = M1(X)
e1M2(X)
e2 . . .Mk(X)
ek
where all Mi are irreducible. Then, from the decomposition based of the elemen-
tary divisors [13, Page 308], we know that there exist k subspaces U1, . . .Uk
invariant under L such that Fn2 = U1 ⊕ U2 . . .⊕ Uk and the minimal polynomial
of the linear application Li induced by L on each Ui equals M
ei
i . Let us consider
t randomly chosen c1, . . . , ct ∈ Fn2 . Then, Lemma 6 implies that
WL(c1, . . . ct) =
k⊕
i=1
WL(ui,1, . . . , ui,t)
where (u1,j , . . . , uk,j) is the unique k-tuple in U1 × . . . × Uk such that cj =∑k
i=1 ui,j . We deduce:
Pr
c1,...,ct
$←Fn2
[WL(c1, · · · , ct) = Fn2 ] =
k∏
i=1
Pr
ui,1,...,ui,t
$←Ui
[WLi(ui,1, · · · , ui,t) =Ui]
Proposition 11 shows that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Pr
ui,1,...,ui,t
$←Vi
[WLi(ui,1, · · · , ui,t) = Vi] =
ri−1∏
j=0
(
1− 1
2(t−j) deg(Mi)
)
,
where ri is the number of invariant factors of L which are multiples of Mi. The
result then directly follows. ut
C Proof of Proposition 5 on the Invariants for Midori-64
The characterization of the invariants g of the S-box layer of Midori-64 which
satisfy {0000, 0001}16 ⊆ LS(g) exploits the following general lemma.
Lemma 7. Let S be a mapping from Fn2 to itself, and W be a linear subspace of
Fn2 . If g ∈ U(S) and W ⊆ LS(g), then g is constant on the sets
ES,W (x) =
⋃
i∈N
S̃iW ({x}), x ∈ Fn2
where
S̃W : P(Fn2 )→ P(Fn2 )
X 7→
⋃
w∈W {S(S(x) + w) + w, x ∈ X} .
Moreover, if S is an involution, then there exists k ∈ N such that ES,W (x) =
S̃kW ({x}) for all x ∈ Fn2 .
Proof. Let g ∈ U(S). Then, there exists ε1 ∈ F2 such that g(S(x)) = g(x) + ε1
for all x ∈ Fn2 . Let w ∈W . Then, w is a ε2-linear structure of g for some ε2 ∈ F2.
It follows that, for any x ∈ Fn2 ,
g(S(S(x) + w) + w) = g(S(S(x) + w)) + ε2 = g(S(x) + w) + ε1 + ε2
= g(S(x)) + ε2 + ε1 + ε2 = g(x) + ε1 + ε2 + ε1 + ε2 = g(x) .
Then, g is constant on the sets ES,W (x). If g is an involution, then X ⊆ S̃W (X)
for any set X. Indeed, since 0 ∈W , we have
S̃W (X) ⊇ {S(S(x)), x ∈ X} = X .
It follows that the sequence (S̃iW ({x}))i∈N is an increasing sequence for inclusion.
Then, there exists kx such that ES,W (x) = S̃kxW ({x}). We get the result by
choosing k = maxx kx. ut
In Midori-64 the sets ES,W (x) have a simple form because S consists of
16 copies of the same 4-bit S-box, Sb, and W also corresponds to 16-th Cartesian
power of a subspace of F42, namely W = V 16 with V = {0000, 0001}. Then, we
can deduce the characterization given in Prop. 5.
Proof (of Prop. 5). Using that S consists of 16 copies of Sb and that W = V 16
with V = {0000, 0001}, we deduce that, for any x0, . . . , x15 ∈ F42,
S̃W ({(x0, . . . , x15)})
= {Sb(Sb(x0) + w0) + w0, . . . Sb(Sb(x15) + w15) + w15, wi ∈ V }
= S̃bV ({x0})× . . .× S̃bV ({x15}) .
Then, for any k ∈ N,
S̃kW ({(x0, . . . , x15)}) = S̃b
k
V ({x0})× . . .× S̃b
k
V ({x15}) .
Since the S-box layer is an involution, we deduce from the previous lemma that
ES,W ((x0, . . . , x15)) = ESb,V (x0)× . . .× ESb,V (x15) .
Now, for the Midori S-box, any ESb,V (x) correspond to one of the following sets
H00 = {8}, H10 = {9}, H01 = {0, 3, 5, 6, b, c, f} and H11 = {1, 2, 4, 7, a, d, e} .
Moreover, all these four sets satisfy that, for any x ∈ Hab, S̃b
k
({x}) = Hab for
all k ≥ 6. Therefore, for any x = (x0 . . . x15) ∈ F162 ,
ES,W (x) = Hb0b1 ×Hb2b3 × . . .×Hb30b31
for some b ∈ F322 . Since any g ∈ U(S) with W ⊆ LS(g) must be constant on all
ES,W (x), we deduce that its support must be a union of such sets, i.e.,
Supp(g) =
⋃
b0...b31∈A
Hb0b1 ×Hb2b3 × . . .×Hb30b31
where A is a subset of F322 . It is worth noticing that, since all the sets Hb0...b31 =
Hb0b1 × Hb2b3 × . . . × Hb30b31 are disjoint, this equivalently means that g is a
linear combination of the 232 functions of 64 variables
gb0...b31 =
15∏
i=0
fb2ib2i+1 where Suppfb2ib2i+1 = Hb2ib2i+1 .
Let us now characterize the sets A which guarantee that W ⊆ LS(g). Let h
denote the Boolean function of 32 variables whose support equals A. We observe
that, for any b0b1 ∈ F22, 00001 +Hb0b1 = Hb0+1b1 . It follows that, for any w ∈W
and any b ∈ F322 , the image of the translation of Hb by w is equal to Hb+π(w)
where π(w) is the 32-bit word defined by π(w)i = 00 if wi = 0000 and π(w)i = 10
if wi = 0001 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. Therefore, if w ∈W is a 0-linear structure for g,
we have that b ∈ F322 belongs to Supp(h) if and only if (b+π(w)) ∈ Supp(h). This
equivalently means that π(w) is a 0-linear structure for h. Similarly, if w ∈W is
a 1-linear structure for g, we have that b ∈ F322 belongs to Supp(h) if and only
if (b+ π(w)) 6∈ Supp(h). This means that π(w) is a 1-linear structure for h. We
then conclude that π(W ) = {00, 10}16 ⊆ LS(h).
Conversely, it is easy to check that all functions g such that
Supp(g) =
⋃
b0...b31∈Supp(h)
Hb0b1 ×Hb2b3 × . . .×Hb30b31
with π(W ) ⊆ LS(h) are invariants for the nonlinear layer of Midori-64. Indeed,
each set Hb0b1 is invariant under Sb. This property is closed under addition,
implying that any such g is an invariant for S. Moreover, any w ∈ {0000, 0001}16
is a linear structure for g because π(w) is a linear structure for h. ut
D Sage Code of the Algorithms
1 from sage . geometry . hyperplane arrangement . a f f i n e s u b s p a c e
import Aff ineSubspace
2
3 # conver t s an i n t e g e r to a b inary vec t o r . The f i r s t b i t
r e p r e s en t s the msb . Example :
t o b i n a r y v e c t o r (0 xb , 4 ) = (1 ,0 ,1 ,1)
t o b i n a r y v e c t o r (0 xab ,12) = (0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,1)
4 def t o b i n a r y v e c t o r ( a , l ength ) :
5 l s = I n t e g e r ( a ) . b i t s ( ) [ : : − 1 ]
6 return vec to r (GF(2) , length , [ 0 ] ∗ ( length−len ( l s ) )+l s )
7
8 # Eva lua tes the S−box l a y e r wi th p a r a l l e l a p p l i c a t i o n o f S−box
S ( o f b i t l e n g t h b i t S ) on vec t o r v
9 def s b o x l a y e r e v a l (S , b i t S , v ) :
10 w = copy ( v )
11 for i in range ( len (w) / b i t S ) :
12 w[ ( i ∗ b i t S ) : ( ( i +1)∗ b i t S ) ] =
13 l i s t ( t o b i n a r y v e c t o r (S [ ZZ( l i s t (w[ ( i ∗ b i t S ) : ( ( i +1)∗
b i t S ) ] [ : : − 1 ] ) , base = 2) ] , b i t S ) )
14 return w
15
16 # re turns complement C o f V s . t . C. i n t e r s e c t i o n (V) i s t r i v i a l
17 def decomposit ion complement (V) :
18 L1 = l i s t (V. b a s i s ( ) )
19 L2 = l i s t (V. ambient vec to r space ( ) . b a s i s ( ) )
20 R = [ ]
21 # ba s i s ex t ens i on
22 for v in L2 :
23 i f ( v not in span (L1) ) :
24 L1 . append ( v )
25 R. append ( v )
26 return span (R)
27
28
29 # Now, the code o f the a c t ua l a l go r i t hms f o l l ow s
30
31 # input : l i s t o f d i f f e r e n c e s D, l i n e a r l a y e r L as a matrix
32 # output : the subspace W L(D)
33 def W space (D, L) :
34 R = [ ]
35 for c in D:
36 for j in range (L . m u l t i p l i c a t i v e o r d e r ( ) ) :
37 R. append ( (L∗∗ j ) ∗c )
38 return span (R)
39
40 # input : S−box S , subspace Z o f W L(D)
41 # i f true , the cons tan t s prevent i n va r i an t a t t a c k s
42 def check with sbox (S , Z) :
43 b i t S = int ( l og ( len (S) ,2 ) )
44
45 # de f i n e the co s e t 0 + Z as an a f f i n e space ( wi th o f f s e t
0) and choose a complement Q of Z
46 # Q i s isomorphic to (GF(2) ˆn)/Z and each q in Q i s a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a d i f f e r e n t co s e t q + Z
47 A = Aff ineSubspace (0 ,Z)
48 Q = Aff ineSubspace (0 , decomposit ion complement (Z) )
49
50 # l s w i l l i n d i c a t e a l l c o s e t s ” h i t ” by the S−box l a y e r
51 l s = set ( )
52 k = 2∗∗Q. dimension ( )
53 print ( repr ( k ) + ’ c o s e t s to check ’ )
54 percent done = 0
55
56 # repea t t h i s u n t i l each co s e t i s h i t
57 while ( len ( l s ) < k ) :
58 # every time , choose a random vec to r a in Z and look
in which co s e t i t i s mapped by the S−box l a y e r
59 a = A. l i n e a r p a r t ( ) . random element ( ) + A. po int ( )
60 b = s b o x l a y e r e v a l (S , b i t S , a )
61 # q g i v e s the unique r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the co s e t in Q
62 q = Q. i n t e r s e c t i o n ( Af f ineSubspace (b , Z) ) . po int ( )
63 # we add the vec t o r q in the s e t o f c o s e t s h i t . We
repre s en t the vec t o r as an i n t e g e r
64 l s . add (ZZ( l i s t ( q ) , base=2) )
65 i f ( len ( l s ) /k >= ( percent done +1)/100) :
66 percent done = percent done + 1
67 print ( repr ( percent done ) + ’ % done ’ )
68 return t rue
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